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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***RM
Date: 1/9/2018 6:44 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
OMAR ABDEL-ALEEM, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

MINALKUMARPATEL, et al.,
Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs,
V.

JOSEPH & ALEEM, LLC d/b/a JOSEPH,
ALEEM & SLOWJK, et al.,
Third Party Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action file No. 2017CV287616

ORDER ON THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
The above styled matter is before the Court on Third Party Defendants Joseph & Aleem, LLC and
Jacob Slowik's Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint. Having considered the third party
pleadings, the Court herein grants the foregoing motion in part and denies it in part, finding as follows:
SUMMARY OF THIRD PARTY PLEADINGS
As alleged in the Third Party Complaint, Defendantffhird Party Plaintiff LabSolutions LLC
("LabSolutions") is a clinical laboratory that provides laboratory testing services for medical providers as
well as practice management, consulting, and diagnostic laboratory testing for health care providers
throughout the United States. LahSolutions engaged Third Party Defendant Joseph, Aleem & Slowik
("Aleem Firm") to serve as its "outside general counsel", advising LabSolutions on legal matters,
including regulatory compliance, litigation and transactional matters. The Aleem Firm was paid a
monthly retainer for its legal services. Third Party Defendant Jacob Slowik ("Slowik") and Plaintiffs
Yussef and Tarek Abdel-Aleem ( collectively "Aleem Attorneys") are attorneys at the Aleem Firm.
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In 2014, Lab Solutions identified a potential business opportunity to provide genetics testing
services to customers and shared the opportunity with the Aleem Attorneys, "seeking legal guidance on
how to properly structure the new venture."! Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs assert the Aleem Attorneys
thereafter "began to position themselves so they could improperly benefit from their clients'
opportunity.v' Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants allegedly "orchestrated a method to raid
LabSolutions' coffers" by drafting an Operating Agreement under which Plaintiffs (including the Aleem
Attorneys), as Class B equity holders, would acquire 25% of LabSolutions' genetics testing business.3

Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs allege they were provided no consideration for the interest
Plaintiffs took in LabSolutions. Further, they assert the Aleem Attorneys and the Third Party Defendants
drafted the Operating Agreement so as to improperly favor their collective interests and rights in
LabSolutions over that of their clients, acquiring an interest in LabSolutions on "unfair and unreasonable"
terms such that Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs ultimately voided the Operating Agreement. Based on
the foregoing, Defendantsffhird Party Plaintiffs assert the following claims in their Third Party
Complaint: (I) breach of fiduciary duty and breach of duty of loyalty; (2) punitive damages; (3) violation
of Georgia's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, alleging predicates acts of
theft (including theft by taking, theft by deception, and theft by receiving stolen property), mail fraud
(18 U.S.C. §1341), and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343); (4) conspiracy to violate Georgia's RICO Act; and
(5) attorneys' fees and expenses.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-l 1-12(b)(6), the Court shall not sustain a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless "(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose
with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in
support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence
2

Third Party Complaint, iJ7.
Third Party Complaint, ,is.
Third Party Complaint, ,J9.
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within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought." Racette v. Bank
of Am., N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171, I 71 (2012). "In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be
construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be
resolved in the filing party's favor." Anderson v. Daniel, 314 Ga. App. 394,395 (2012).

B. Third Party Claims
(1) Count I: Breach ofFiduciary Duty and Duty ofLoyalty
Third Party Defendants argue the breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty claim should be
dismissed because Third Party Plaintiffs: fail to allege sufficient facts to state the claim; fail to allege any
self-dealing or improper benefit obtained by Third Party Defendants; fail to sufficiently allege damages;
and expressly consented to the conflict of interest of the Aleem Finn. Third Party Plaintiffs maintain they
have alleged sufficient facts to support their claim and, even if they have not done so, the Court should
allow them to amend their pleading rather than dismissing the claim because Third Party Defendants have
failed to establish that there is no statement of facts that could possibly support the claim.
A party asserting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty must establish (1) the existence of a
fiduciary duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach. See Tom Brown
Contracting Inc. v. Fishman, 289 Ga. App. 601, 603 (2008).
Here, Third Party Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the existence of a fiduciary duty as they
assert LabSolutions engaged the Aleem Firm to serve as its outside legal counsel and its attorneys advised
LabSolutions on a variety of legal matters.4 See Cordell & Cordell, P.C. v. Gao, 331 Ga. App. 522, 526
(2015) ("An attorney-client relationship imposes upon the attorney a fiduciary duty of utmost good faith
and loyalty, which includes the responsibility not to pursue interests or take acts adverse to the client's
interest'') (citations omitted).

See also Hodge v. URFA-Sexton, LP, 295 Ga. 136, 139 (2014) ("[I]f one

attorney in a firm has an actual conflict of interest, we impute that conflict to all the attorneys in the

firm.

subjecting the entire firm to disqualification") (citation omitted).

4
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Further, Third Party Plaintiffs have adequately pied that Third Party Defendan ts breached their
fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty by benefiting themselves to the detriment of their clients and that Third
Party Plaintiffs have been dam aged by such breaches. Specifically, they allege: the Operating Agreement
benefited Plaintiffs to the detriment of LabSolutions because there was no independent consideration for
the 25% interest given to Plaintiffs; the Aleem Attorneys and Third Party Defendants drafted the
Operating Agreement so that it improperly favored their collective interests and rights in LabSolutions
5

over that of their clients, i.e. Third Party Plaintiffs, and as a result, Defendants have been damaged. See

White v. Shamrock Bldg. Systems, 294 Ga. App. 340, 346 (2008) ("The relation of principal and agent is
a fiduciary one, and ... the agent may not make a pro.fit for himself out of the relationship, or out of the
knowledge obtained from the relationship, to the injury of the principal"). Construing the Third Party
Complaint most favorably to Third Party Plaintiffs and resolving aU doubts regarding such pleadings in
their favor, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty.
Third Party Defendants also argue Third Party Plaintiffs expressly waived any actual or potential
conflict of interest of the Aleem Firm pursuant to Section 9. I 6 of the Operating Agreement such that no
breach of fiduciary duty or duty of loyalty can be shown. However, whether Third Party Plaintiffs
provided informed consent and the enforceability of the Operating Agreement are matters that are
strongly contested in the pleadings and are at issue in a motion for summary judgment upon which the
Court has reserved ruling pending discovery. See Paul v. Smith, Gambrell & Russell, 267 Ga. App. 107,
110 (2004) ("While a conflict of interest may be waived, such waiver must be knowingly made after full

5

Third Party Complaint, ,i,i 8-12, 19. Third Party Plaintiffs' response brief includes substantial, factual
allegations not found in their Third Party Complaint. For example, they allege: Slowik carved out an exception in
the Operating Agreement for the Aleem Plaintiffs to actively compete against LabSolutions; the Aleem Plaintiffs
improperly solicited LabSolutions' customers, conspired with Omar Abdel Aleem to work with Otogentics to create
a competing laboratory, and disclosed business secrets to competitors; Slowik knew that Omar was creating a
competing lab but withheld that information from his client; Third Party Defendants failed to disclose the Aleem
Attorneys were officers in businesses that compete with LabSolutions; the Aleem Attorneys used their position as
counsel of LabSolutions to influence the decision to hire Omar as a LabSolutions executive in order to further
control the company; and using information "derived from client communications between LabSolutions and the
Aleem Firm", Omar attempted to extort Third Party Plaintiffs, threatening to disclose the information to
LahSolutions' business partners unless they paid money. See Third Party Plaintiffs' Response Brief, pp. 5-6, 10-13.
See note 8, infra.
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disclosure of all facts");

In re Estate of Peterson, 255 Ga. App. 303. 304 (2002) (citation omitted) ("[A]n

attorney's full disclosure is essential to the client's informed decision and consent... [I]f a client's written
consent (or a lawyer's written notice to the client) does not include the required full disclosure as part of
the writing. it must contain some recognition that the client's decision and consent were made with
knowledge of the potential conflict of interest"). Thus, these disputed issues provide no basis for
dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty/duty of loyalty claim at the pleading stage.
(2) Counts Ill and JV: Violations ofand Conspiracy to Violate Georgia's Civil Rico Act
Under Georgia's RICO statute, it is "unlawful for any person. through a pattern of racketeering
activity or proceeds derived therefrom. to acquire or maintain. directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise, real property, or persona] property of any nature. including money." O.C.G.A. §
l 6-14-4(a). A "racketeering activity," also known as a "predicate act," is the commission of. the attempt
to commit. or the solicitation or coercing of another to commit a "crime which is chargeable by
indictment" under certain laws of the state of Georgia and the United States. O.C.G.A. §16-14-3(5);
Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2013). A "pattern of racketeering activity'' means to engage in
at least two acts of racketeering activity that are "interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated incidents" and that were done "in furtherance of one or more incidents. schemes, or transactions."
O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(4).
Further, it is unlawful to conspire to violate the substantive provisions of Georgia's RICO Act.
See O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(c). Under Georgia law, a person may be found liable for RICO conspiracy "if
they knowingly and willfully join a conspiracy which itself contains a common plan or purpose to commit
two or more predicate acts." Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 165.
To assert a civil claim based upon either a violation of the RICO statute
or a conspiracy to violate that statute. a plaintiff must show that the
defendants violated or conspired to violate the RICO statute; that as a
result of this conduct the plaintiff has suffered injury; and that the
defendant's violation of or conspiracy to violate the RICO statute was the
proximate cause of the injury.
Id. (citing Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates. 319 Ga. App. 101. 109(2)(b) (2012)).
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Here, Third Party Defendants urge the RICO claims should be dismissed because the predicate
offenses are not pied with particularity and there is no "pattern of racketeering activity'' in that all
incidents alleged are based on a single transaction-the parties' Operating Agreement. Third Party
Plaintiffs contend their allegations are sufficient to state RICO claims and even if the claims were not
pled with sufficient specificity, the remedy is to order them to provide a more definite statement rather
than dismissal. Additionally, they contend their Third Party Complaint and Counterclaim demonstrate an
"'interrelated pattern of criminal activity' showing 'subterfuge and intimidation:" sufficient to establish
the requisite pattern to state a RICO claim."

Sufficiency ofthe Pleadings
Third Party Plaintiffs generally allege that Third Party Defendants, while serving as their legal
counsel, acted in concert with Plaintiffs to devise and perpetrate a scheme to insert unfair and
unreasonable provisions in the Operating Agreement that favored their interests over that of LabSolutions
with the intent to defraud and deceive Third Party Plaintiffs into surrendering their property, including
dividend payments from LabSolutions, attorneys' fees, other fees, and salary and benefits paid to Omar
Abdel Aleem. Pursuant to the Third Party Complaint, the civil RICO claims are based on various alleged
predicate offenses", specifically: theft (including theft by taking, theft by deception and theft by
receiving); mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341); and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343). The foregoing are offenses
which can serve as the predicate acts necessary to support a RICO claim. See O.C.G.A. §16-143(5)(A)(xii) and (C).
"A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful
possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of
6

Third Party Plaintiffs' Response Brief, p. 9.
In their response brief, Third Party Plaintiffs attempt to assert theft by extortion as an additional predicate
offense and attempt to add factual allegations in support of their other asserted predicated offenses. See note 6,
supra. However, those aJlegations bave not been pied in the Third Party Complaint-the operative pleading with
respect to the allegations made against Third Party Defendants, and the Court's review of the instant motion to
dismiss is limited to that pleading. See O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b). Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs invite the Court to
also look to the allegations made in their Counterclaim "to flesh out the claims against the Third Party Defendants",
but provide no legal authority for that request. Given the allegations of fraud permeating Defendants/Third Party
Plaintiffs' pleadings and the specificity with which such matters must be pied, the Court declines to do so.
7
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the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated." O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2.

See also Patterson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 663, 665 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by Stephens v.
State, 289 Ga. 758, 759 (2011) ("[T]he phrase 'regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or
appropriated' is a catch-all phrase rendering our theft by taking statute broad enough to encompass theft
by conversion, theft by deception or any other of the myriad and even yet-to-be-concocted schemes for
depriving people of their property"). Theft by deception occurs when a person "obtains property by any
deceitful means or artful practice with the intention of depriving the owner of the property." O.C.G.A.
§16-8-3. "A person commits the offense of theft by receiving stolen property when he receives, disposes
of, or retains stolen property which he knows or should know was stolen unless the property is received,
disposed of, or retained with intent to restore it to the owner" and, under Georgia law, "receiving'' means
"acquiring possession or control or lending on the security of the property." O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a).
Here, with respect to their theft related allegations, Third Party Plaintiffs vaguely assert Third
Party Defendants "used deceitful means and artful practices to create and confirm their victims'
impressions of existing facts which were false and which they knew or believed to be false" and
"prevented Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs and other agents from acquiring information relevant [sic]
the disposition of their property.r" Third Party Plaintiffs also allege Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants
"made promises" related to the transfer of Third Party Plaintiff's property "that were false and were made
for the purpose of deceiving'' them into surrendering their shares in LabSolutions.
However, Third Party Plaintiffs fail to allege what false impressions were created, how they were
prevented from obtaining information, or what promises were made by Third Party Defendants to deceive
and induce them to surrender their property. These allegations sounding in fraud lack the requisite
specificity to place Third Party Defendants (the Aleem Firm and Slowik in his individual capacity) on
notice of the claims being asserted against them. See O.C.G.A. §9-11-9(b). See also Hayes v. Hallmark
Apartments. Inc., 232 Ga. 307, 309 (1974) (The purpose of Georgia law requiring that fraud be pled with

8
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particularity "is to insure that a defendant has sufficient notice to enable him to prepare a responsive
pleading"); Diversified Holding Com. v. Clayton McLendon. Inc., 120 Ga. App. 455, 456 (1969) ("(T]he
circum stances constituting the fraud must be stated with particularity. At the very least the pleader should
designate the occasions on which affirm ative misstatements were made and by whom and in what way
they were acted upon").
However, the insufficiency of the fraud-based theft allegations does not warr ant dismissal
outright. Thir d Part y Plain tiffs are correct in that requirin g a more definite statement is the appropriate
remedy at the pleadings stage. See Maddox v. S. Eng'g Co., 216 Ga. App. 6, 7 (1994) (error to dismiss

RICO claim which was based on defendants' alleged violation of O.C.G.A. §16-10-20, for making false
statements to government entities to persuade them to build on an alternative site, where the plaintiff did
not specify what false statements were made, noting the defendants could move for a more definite
statement). Compare Scouten v. Amerisave Mortg. Com., 284 Ga. App. 242, 243 (2007), rev'd on other
grounds, 283 Ga. 72 (2008), and vacated in part on other grounds, 291 Ga. App. 493 (2008) (affirming
dismissal of RICO claim based on alleged witness tampering for failure to state a claim where the
complaint did not allege witness tampering).
"The elements of mail and wire fraud are identical. 'Mail or wire fraud occurs when a person
( 1) intentionally participates in a scheme to defraud another of money or property and (2) uses the mails
or wires in furtherance of that scheme.": Cesnilc v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 906 n. 8 (11th
Cir. 1996) (citing Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1498 (11th Cir. 1991)). See 18 U.S.C. §1341 and
§ 1343. See also United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 903 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[T)he mail fraud statute
reaches schemes in which the defendant did not himself place any matter in the mails; it is sufficient to
show that be "caused" the mailings ... The scope of the wire fraud statute is equally broad") (citations
omitted).
Here, Third Party Plaintiffs allege Defendants transmitted or caused to be transmitted by means
of wire and mail communications "writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds for the purpose of
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executing" a "scheme or artifice to defraud" them.

9

Specifically, they identify the transmittal of "drafts

and execution versions of the Operating Agreement" as well as "invoices and requests for payment for the
purported provision of legal services related to their representation of LabSolutions" and checks and wires
transmitted to the Aleem Attorneys and Third Party Defendants for payment of those "purported legal
services." Again, construing the Third Party Complaint most favorably to Third Party Plaintiffs and
resolving all doubts regarding such pleadings in their favor as the Court is required to do at the pleadings
stage, the foregoing allegations are sufficient to state the predicate acts of wire and mail fraud.
Pattern ofRacketeering Activity
To demonstrate a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4, the claimant must "show an injury by a pattern
of racketeering activity. A pattern requires at least two interrelated predicate offenses." Mbigi v. Wells
Fargo Home Mortg., 336 Ga. App. 316, 322 (2016) ( citing Brown v. Freedman, 222 Ga. App. 213, 217(3)
(1996)) (emphasis added). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §16-14-3(4)(A), to constitute a "pattern of racketeering
activity", the acts of racketeering must be taken "in furtherance of one or more incidents, schemes, or
transactions that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents."
(Emphasis added).
Here, Third Party Defendants urge the Third Part Complaint fails to state any RICO claim
because the allegations do not show a "pattern of racketeering activity" but rather are all related to one
transaction-the negotiation and execution of the Operating Agreement. Several Georgia cases have
denied RICO claims on the basis that the alleged offenses are or are related to a single transaction rather
than the requisite "pattern" of racketeering acts. See Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 273 Ga. 44, 48
(2000) ("The fact that elements of two different crimes may have been present at two separate points in
time does not create two predicate acts [for RICO purposes] out of what is in reality a single
transaction"). See, e.g., Id. (rejecting claimant's request to "parse ... [a] single act of forgery into two

9
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different criminal acts-forgery and mail fraud-so that they ... might serve as the predicate for a RICO
claim "); Stargate Softw are Int'L Inc. v. Rumph, 224 Ga. App. 873 (1997) (actions of computer services
provider's competitor in taking provider's computers, data and records and, at separate time, allegedly
using and alterin g them to provider's injury were part of a single transaction stemmin g from joint ventur e
negotiations between two entities, and therefore did not constitute two predicate acts of racketeering
activity necessary to support a RICO claim); Raines v. State. 219 Ga. App. 893, 894(1) (1996) (holding
"[t]he sale of timber from a single parcel of property, by means of a single deed, in one isolated
transaction" could not be broken into two predicate acts by separately charging the sale of the land in
excess of its true value through "false timber-cruising reports" and filing false deed); Kennon Realty
Svcs .• 191 Ga. App. 740, 741-742(2) (1989) (real estate transaction am ong four persons and a company,
including several loans, where borrower alleged theft in that he was fraudulently induced into obtainin g a
loan secured by his home constituted "only the one extended transaction between [parties]" and not "a
pattern ofracketeering activity" within the meaning of RICO).
Notably, however, the foregoing cases were decided under previous iterations of Georgia's RI CO
Act. As noted in a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Georgia, O.C.G.A. §13-14-3 was amended
in 2001 to provide the predicate offenses be taken "in furtherance of one or more incidents, schemes, or

transactions," such that if two or more alleged predicate acts were taken in furtherance of one transaction,
that is sufficient to state a civil RICO claim. See Mbigi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 336 Ga. App. 316,
323 (2016) (emphasis in original). See also 4 Ga. Jur. Business Torts and Trade Regulation§ 7:21 ("Prior
to 2001, the defense that multiple acts created only a single transaction was recognized by several
Georgia courts, including the Georgia Supreme Court [in Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 273 Ga. 44]"
but "[i]n response to tb[at] decision", the Georgia General Assembly amended the statute to provide that a
pattern of racketeering activity means engaging in at least two racketeering acts in furtherance of "one or
more" incidents, schemes, or transactions).
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Here, although Third Party Plaintiffs' allegations center on the Operating Agreement, they allege
Third Party Defendants through acts of fraud and deception took their property, and to execute their
scheme used or caused to be used mail or wire comm unications. If the fraud claims are properly pied such
would be sufficient to allege a pattern of racketeering activity.

(3) Counts II and V: Punitive Damages and Attorneys' Fees
Insofar as at this juncture substantive claims remain for which punitive damages and attorneys'
fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded, those derivative claims survive the instant motion. See
J. Andrew Lunsford Properties, LLC v. Davis, 257 Ga. App. 720, 722 (2002).
CONCLUSION
Given the above, the Court at this time denies Third Party Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Third Party Complaint. However, the Court hereby ORDERS Third Party Plaintiffs to amend their third
party pleadings within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this order to provide a more definite statement with
respect to their fraud-based theft allegations, specifically as alleged against Third Party Defendants (the
Aleem Firm and Slowik in his individual capacity) and which Third Party Plaintiffs contend serve as
predicate acts for their third party RICO claims.
SO ORDERED, this 9th day of January, 2018.

/~ !<'._, :'.)~
Melvin K. Westmoreland, Senior Judge
Metro Atlanta Business Case Division
Fulton County Superior Court
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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